Department of Applied Mathematics & Physics, Kyoto University
Technical Report 2004-005 (April 21, 2004)
Dynamic Programming Approach to Discrete Time Dynamic Feedback Stackelberg Games with Independent and Dependent Followers
by Pu-yan Nie, Li-hua Chen and Masao Fukushima
Stackelberg games play extremely important roles in such fields as
economics, management, politics and behavioral sciences.
Stackelberg game can be modelled as a bilevel optimization
problem. There exists extensive literature about static bilevel
optimization problems. However, the studies on dynamic bilevel
optimization problems are relatively scarce in spite of the
importance in explaining and predicting some phenomena
rationally. In this paper, we consider discrete time dynamic
Stackelberg games with feedback information. Dynamic programming
algorithms are presented for the solution of discrete time
dynamic feedback Stackelberg games with multiple players both for
independent followers and for dependent followers. When the
followers act dependently, the game in this paper is a combination
of Stackelberg game and Nash one.